Fordham Law Review
Volume 32

Issue 2

Article 6

1963

Equal Protection and Discrimination in Public Accommodations

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Equal Protection and Discrimination in Public Accommodations , 32 Fordham L. Rev. 327 (1963).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol32/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

1963]

COMMENTS

from people outside their own organization.8s Such a situation works a great
hardship on the individual innovator who lacks the necessary capital to exploit
his own inventions. In such a case, the man who develops the idea is faced
with a dilemma: should he disclose it without the assurance of a confidential
s4
relationship, or keep it to himself and never realize the fruits of his labor?
Such a Hobson's choice would not be forced on this valuable source of creative
ideas if businessmen knew that the courts would impartially determine the
relative rights of the parties upon termination of confidential relations. In short,
the courts should balance their tendency toward "enforcing increasingly higher
standards of fairness or commercial morality in trade" with the need for the
contributions of individual inventors toward the "progress of science." By
granting relief only to the extent of the rights of the parties involved, such a
balance could be more effectively achieved.

EQUAL PROTECTION AND DISCRIMINATION IN
PUBLIC ACCOMIMODATIONS
The most controversial of the proposals before the present session of the
United States Congress is a bill to eliminate discrimination in those public accommodations, specifically hotels, motels, retail and service establishments,
affecting interstate commerce.' Since Gibbons v. Ogden,2 congressional power
83. How To Sell An Idea, Changing Times, December, 1957, pp. 23-25; Ideas from
Outsiders Can Be Dangerous, Chemical Week, August 17, 1957, pp. 108-18.
84. One major company, Johnson & Johnson, requires agreement to the following conditions before it will accept a suggestion from someone outside the company:
CONDITIONS OF SUBMISSION
1. The company does not solicit suggestions, and sending this policy folder does not constitute an invitation to disclose an idea.
2. No suggestion will be considered unless it is submitted in writing. Material submitted
will not be returned, and the person forwarding it should retain a duplicate.
3. No suggestion will be accepted on the basis of a confidential relationship, or under a
guarantee that the idea shall be kept secret, or on condition that the company shall
agree to terms of compensation before it knows the suggestion.
4. A patented idea, or one for which a patent application has been filed, will only be considered on the basis that the submitter will rely exclusively on his rights under the
Patent Statutes. (In the case of a patentable idea, it is suggested that the submitter
protect himself by filing a patent application.)
5 In the case of an idea which has not been patented and for which no patent application
is pending, the company must be the sole judge of the value of the idea to it after an
evaluation on the merits. In no event shall the payment for such an idea exceed $I,000.
6. The company shall not be obligated to give reasons for its decision or to reveal its
past or present activities related to the submitted idea. Negotiating or offering to
purchase an idea shall not prejudice the company nor be deemed an admission of the
novelty, priority or originality of the idea.
1. S. 1732, H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), are the separate versions. By way of
compromise, H-R. 7152 has been amended, and now closely approximates the Senate Bill.
2. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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over interstate commerce has been said to be plenary.3 There is no longer any
semblance of doubt as to the power of Congress to regulate hotels, motels and
retail establishments 4 or to impose on them restrictions proscribing racial discrimination, so long as their activities affect interstate commerce. 5 Difficulties
may be encountered, however, in determining whether a particular public accommodation sufficiently affects interstate commerce so as to sanction federal
regulation. 6 In close cases there may be a tendency to construe the statute so
as to preclude all doubt as to its constitutionality. By so doing, the statute,7
however far Congress may intend it to reach, will be restricted in its application.
I. THE STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
The alternative constitutional basis most frequently suggested is the
fourteenth amendment provision that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." A law based on the
fourteenth amendment would have the advantage of outlawing discrimination
even in local businesses having no connection with interstate commerce, but
at the same time the courts would face the problem of finding "state action,"
as that phrase was used in the Civil Rights Cases8 which declared unconstitutional a law very similar to that now under consideration. The Civil Rights
Law of 1875 guaranteed "the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
The Supreme Court described congressional power over commerce as the ability "to
....
" Id. at
227. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 111 (1941).
4. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 75 Stat. 71 (1961), 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2)(iU) (Supp.
IV, 1963). Since it was necessary in this section to exempt hotels from the act, one may
conclude that such hotels may be engaged in interstate commerce. A retail sale falls within
interstate commerce when the contract requires shipment of the buyer's goods to his out of
state residence, Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 292 (1921), or when
it is made after the seller transports goods into a state for the purpose of sale, American Steel
& Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500, 521 (1904). The same is true when the salo Is made
prior to the buyer's transporting the purchase out of state, United States v. Rock Royal
Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, (1939), when it is solicited from without the state, Asher v. Texas, 128
U.S. 129 (1888), and when the seller imports goods to sell to residents of his state, Vance v.
W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 447 (1898).
S. The Interstate Commerce Act, which contains a section outlawing discrimination in
general on interstate carriers, has been interpreted as outlawing racial segregation. Boynton
v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (a bus terminal lunch counter serving interstate travelers
held within the act); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941) (railroad forced to
contract with Negro to provide him Pullman service).
6. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). The Court failed to find
a sufficient effect on commerce in the operation of taxis which spent a large part of their
time delivering passengers to terminals to embark on interstate journeys. Id at 230-34.
7. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court
decided that although the provision that extends the National Labor Relations Act to all
business "affecting" commerce could be read literally to embrace all business and would
thus be unreasonable and unconstitutional, the words should be interpreted to include
those businesses which clearly affect commerce. Id. at 30-33.
8. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
3.

limit and restrain it at pleasure . . . [which] power must be exclusive
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advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theatres and other places of public amusement ...

."0

It made no men-

tion of state action. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting,10 held
that since it addressed itself to individuals acting as such, the law exceeded the
constitutional authority of Congress. Mr. Justice Bradley, writing for the
Court, stated:
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [fourteenth]
amendment.... It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal
law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against
the operation of State laws, and the action of State officers executive or judicial .... 1
And further,
it is absurd to affirm that

. . .

because the denial by a State to any persons, of the

equal protection of the laws, is prohibited by12the amendment, therefore Congress
may establish laws for their equal protection.
From the time of the Civil Rights Cases to the present, the effective scope
of the equal protection clause has been constantly expanded, but the "state
action" test has never been seriously questioned by the courts. The elaborate
rationalizations that have been devised to find state action, in order to extend
the protection of the fourteenth amendment, have only served to make the
requisite all the more "firmly embedded in our constitutional law. 1 3a Even the
cases which have gone farthest in extending the protection of the fourteenth
amendment to new areas have done so in terms of the "state action" test.
It must be remembered, however, that the Court in the Civil Rights Cases
had no occasion to lay down any detailed criteria for determining whether
state action was present or not. The law considered in those cases made no
mention whatsoever of the states or their involvement in the proscribed activities.
Thus courts have had considerable leeway in defining "state action." As might
be expected, no precise formula has ever been established, and the test is always
stated in broad terms. A recent decision declares that: "[P1rivate conduct
abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause
unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has . . .
become involved in it.'

14

These broad definitions, however, give little or no inkling of the wide variety
of situations in which state action has been found to exist. State action was found
to exist where a state merely enforced, through its judiciary, a racially re9. Ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
10. It is ironic that the lone dissenter was the first Mr. Justice Harlan, wvho argued for
a more liberal interpretation of the amendment. The present Air. Justice Harlan has tended
to be more conservative than the rest of the Court. See, for example, his concurring opinion
in Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963).
11. 109 U-S. at 11.
12. Id. at 13.
13. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
14.

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). Accord, Peterson

v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247 (1963).
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strictive covenant among private individuals.' 5 Acts of state officials have
been held to be acts of the state even when performed in clear violation of the
laws of the state.' 6 The segregated seating rules of a municipally franchised
bus company are acts of the state when criminal sanctions are provided for
their violation, 17 and one operating a business on property leased from the
state may, under certain circumstances, be forbidden to discriminate. 18 The
Supreme Court has implied in the latter situation that the state was under a
positive duty to require a clause in the lease forbidding discrimination.' 0 A
state has similarly been held to be under a positive duty to act to protect individuals from mob violence, 20 thus, in effect, being guilty of unconstitutional state
action in its very inaction.
In Peterson v. City of Greenville2' the mere existence of a municipal segregation ordinance (which was, of course, void and which the authorities did
not attempt to enforce) was held sufficient to invalidate the convictions of a
group of "sit-in" demonstrators found guilty, under a general trespass statute,
of having refused to leave a restaurant after having been requested to do so
by the owner. In Lombard v. Louisiana,22 decided the same day, the Court
went further and held that the public statements of city officials in support of
segregation constituted sufficient state action to invalidate similar trespass
convictions, even in the absence of a municipal segregation law.
The last two cases probably represent the farthest limit to which the "state
action" concept has thus far been stretched, and are likely to foster the
impression that the decisions applying the fourteenth amendment to racial
questions are founded more in policy than in logic. In Peterson the Court
said that the lunch-counter management "in deciding to exclude Negroes, did
precisely what the city law required." 2 3 But a careful reading of the ordinance
shows that it merely forbade the management to "furnish meals" to Negroes
at the same counter with whites; 24 their mere presence might have been
tolerated without violating the ordinance. The Court presumably considered
this distinction to be insignificant, as it well might if the majority opinion,
like the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, had been based upon the
actual coercive effect of the ordinance. But the majority explicitly refused
to enter into a discussion of what influence the ordinance had upon the manag15. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
16. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879) (judge's illegal exclusion of Negro
jurymen was state action).
17. Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
18. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
19. Id. at 720.
20. Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951)
(police failed to protect arrested persons from Ku Klux Klan mob); Catlette v. United
States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943) (sheriff failed to perform common-law duty of keeping
the peace).
21. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
22. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
23. Id. at 248.
24. Id. at 246.
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er's decision, on the ground that this decision had been "removed . .. from the
sphere of private choice."125 Clearly, this can only be said of the manager's
decision not to serve Negroes; the decision to exclude them, however much
it may have been influenced by the ordinance, was still very much within the
sphere of private choice. And, of course, it is the latter decision that is relevant
to a prosecution for refusing to leave after being ordered to do so, since the
charge could never have arisen if the management had chosen to accept the
economic loss involved in allowing the demonstrators to remain.
It may be worthy of note that the recent cases tend to avoid the words
"state action"' in favor of phrases having somewhat broader connotations,
such as "state participation and involvement"2 0 and "coercion." - 7 The meaning
of the new phrases differs only slightly, if at all, from that of the old, although
the shift in terminology might conceivably presage a still greater attenuation
of the state action requirement.
More significant than the change in semantics, and perhaps more so than the
findings of state action in the cases above, is the absence of Supreme Court
holdings on the negative side of the issue. There is not a single recent case
unequivocally holding that the facts did not show state action and that the
transaction in question was therefore beyond reach of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, we can sometimes say with certainty that a given situation
does involve state action, but we can only rely on inference in saying that a
given situation does iwt involve state action.

IL

BASES FOR FINDING STATE ACTION

The steady diminution of the "state action" requisite has given rise to a
number of arguments which might plausibly be used to defend the constitutionality of a public accommodations measure, and which might even be used
to accomplish most of the bill's objectives through decisional law. These
arguments vary not only in their legal validity, but also in the scope of
activity that would be covered by laws or decisions based on them.2
A. State Enforcement
One of the most far-reaching theories finds sufficient state action in the mere
enforcement by the state of a private discriminatory choice. This theory relies
principally upon Shelley v. Kraemer,2 9 which held that a state court could not
constitutionally enjoin a homeowner from selling his property to a Negro in
25. Id. at 248.
26. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
27.

Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 273 (1963).

28. The "nature of the act" argument, for example, which would extend the strictures
of the fourteenth amendment to any activity affected with a substantial public interest, would
obviously cover a greater number of activities than the "state property" argument, which
would extend only to businesses receiving the benefit of the use of public property under a
lease or franchise. On the other hand, the latter argument has a much firmer foundation
in the cases.
29. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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contravention of a racially restrictive covenant. The Court, in finding that the
judicial action denied the prospective buyers equal protection of the law, emphasized that the owner himself was willing to sell and that, but for the
intervention of the state through its judiciary at the suit of a covenantee, the
buyers would have obtained possession of the property without hindrance.8°
The offense of the state was that it "made available . . the full coercive power
of government to deny to petitioners, on the ground of race or color, the
enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and
financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell."' ' 1
Thus, it is not necessary that the state itself initiate or inspire the original
discriminatory act; it may be enough that the state enforce a private discriminatory choice. Shelley, however, is not necessarily authority for the
proposition that the state cannot enforce in any way a private choice based on
discrimination. A distinction could undoubtedly be based upon the fact that
Shelley did not involve a conflict between an individual demanding protection
against discrimination, and a present owner of property in which that individual
demanded rights. Shelley, in other words, involved a suit to enjoin a sale to a
prospective Negro purchaser and not a suit by a Negro to annul the restrictive
covenant or to compel the present owner to convey to a person with whom he
chose not to deal. Another distinction, possibly more important, may be found
in the fact that the state's enforcement of the covenant involved its adoption
of a discriminatory standard in a much more formal manner than in the
ordinary public accommodations case. In Shelley, the state court, taking official
cognizance of a discriminatory agreement, consciously carried out the discrimination. It did not merely ratify the effect of a prior act of discrimination
by a private individual. This is a case where the "State makes prejudice or
intolerance its policy and enforces it .... ",32 However, in an instance where
the state court convicts under a general trespass statute, it may be aware of
the discriminatory standard behind the exclusion, but need not incorporate that
standard into its own judicial processes in order to determine the result of the
case.
This distinction may be clarified by considering one situation where the
Shelley doctrine might be relevant to a public accommodations case. Let us
suppose that "sit-in" demonstrators were convicted, not for having refused
to leave, but for having entered after being forbidden to do so. Let us further
suppose that the defendants were forbidden to enter only by a sign reading
"Whites Only." In this situation, the fact that the defendants were Negroes
would be an element of the proof, as would the discriminatory sign. The state
court could not possibly convict without taking both into account, just as the
state court in Shelley could not decide the case without considering both the
terms of the discriminatory covenant and the potential buyers' race.
There is no apparent reason why the Shelley doctrine (whether or not limited
30. Id. at 19.

31. Ibid. The Court explicitly noted that the covenant itself does not violate the Constitution. Id. at 31.
32. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 178 (1961) (concurring opinion).
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as suggested above) should not be applied to types of state action other than
that of the state courts. An arrest or prosecution, for example, is another way
in which the state can enforce the discriminatory choices of private persons.
A case often mentioned in conjunction with Shelley is Marsh v. Alabama,=
which reversed a state trespass conviction on the ground that it violated the
first amendment guarantees of freedom of press and religion. The defendant
had attempted to distribute religious literature in a privately owned town over
the objection of its corporate owner. The opinion emphasized the public nature
of the property, and asserted that this public nature gave rise to certain limitations on the ordinary rights of property owners. Thus, it is clear that "the
power of the State to create and enforce property interests must be exercised
within the boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment." 34 Surely,
this does not mean that the state is forbidden in any case to enforce a property
right so as to enable a private owner to do what the state is forbidden to do
directly. For example, although the state could not pass a law decreeing that
no Negro would be allowed to enter the home of a white person, it may enforce
the property right of a private home owner to exclude Negroes. Thus it is an
open question, not to be decided by precedents involving direct state action,
under what circumstances the state's enforcement of a private property interest will be considered to deny equal protection. It is difficult to draw any conclusions from Marsh on this point, due to the great weight there given to the
"preferred position" of first amendment rights. It might even be argued that
the "boundary" placed upon the state's power of enforcing property interests
was imposed primarily by the first amendment, and by the fourteenth only in the
sense that that amendment applies the first to the states.35
Here, as elsewhere, in arguing against the application of the case to the
equal protection clause, it is impossible to cite Supreme Court holdings; but
the dicta generally classify Marsh among cases peculiarly involving first amendment problems. 36
B. State Property
An argument less speculative than the "state enforcement" theory, but not
so far-reaching, is the doctrine that holds the state responsible for the conduct
of those to whom it grants leases or franchises. A leading case in this area is
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority3 7 which decided that a state could not

constitutionally permit the owner of a private business to discriminate, when
that business was on property leased from a state agency and was operated in
close connection with the public facilities of that agency in the same building.
33. 326 US. 501 (1946).
34. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
35. This seems to be the interpretation of Marsh adopted by the Deputy Attorney
General of Maryland in oral argument before the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Maryland, a
yet undecided "sit-in" case. 32 U.S.L. Week 3146 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1963).
36. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-09 (1951) (dictum); Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948)
37. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).

(dictum).

334
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The Court carefully avoided laying down any general rule, so that we cannot
say with certainty that any facilities leased from the state by a private business
are subject to the fourteenth amendment. All that the Court held is "that when a
State leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown to have
been the case here, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be
complied with by the lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants
'38
written into the lease itself."
In a somewhat analogous case, Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co.,80 the
court of appeals reversed breach-of-the-peace convictions of a group of Negroes,
founded upon an ordinance making it a crime to disobey the reasonable seating
regulations of a bus company enjoying a special franchise from the city. The
company had adopted the requirement of segregated seating previously imposed directly by city ordinance. The court of appeals, giving great weight to
the fact that the company enjoyed a special "privilege" (defined as such by
the state constitution) of using the city streets for private profit, held the company rules to be state action.
The limits of the state property doctrine embodied in these two cases are
not yet defined. It is doubtful, however, that a public accommodations law of
any considerable scope could be founded upon this doctrine taken by itself.
C. State Licensing and Regulation
These same cases, however, are frequently cited in connection with a theory
of substantially greater potential which seeks to place a business licensed by
the state on a footing with the businesses in Burton and Boman. Thus, Mr.
Justice Douglas concluded that a restaurant is an "instrumentality of the
State" because of the state's "licensing ... surveillance [and] ... broad powers
4
of visitation and control. '40 In his concurring opinion in Garner v. Louisiana, '
he could "see no way whereby licenses issued by a State to serve the public
can be distinguished from leases of public facilities . . . ,'42 citing Burton. But
the distinguishing characteristic of a franchise, and implicitly of a lease, is
nowhere more clearly stated than in Boman. Noting that the bus company's
use of the streets was a privilege rather than a right, the court distinguished
the public utility which holds what may be called a "special franchise," from an
ordinary business corporation which in common with all others is granted the
franchise
privilege of operating in corporate form but does not have that special
8
of using state property for private gain to perform a public function."
Since even the "ordinary business corporation" owes its existence to the state,
the business which is merely licensed and not incorporated is one step further
removed from the public utility or other business using state property.
The distinction between "franchise" and "license" was underscored by the
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 726.
280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 282-83 (1963)

41. 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
42.
43.

Id. at 184.
280 F.2d at 535.

(concurring opinion).
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New York Court of Appeals in Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club." There
the plaintiff argued that his arbitrary exclusion from a race track violated the
fourteenth amendment. To satisfy the state action requirement he argued that
"the license to conduct horse racing is a franchise to perform a public purpose.""5
In rejecting this argument the court said:
A franchise is a special privilege, conferred by the State on an individual, which
does not belong to the individual as a matter of common right ....
A license, on the other hand, is no more than a permission to exercise a preexisting right or privilege which has been subjected to regulation in the interest of
the public welfare. The grant of a license to promote the public good, in and of
itself, however, . . . neither renders the enterprise public nor places the licensee
46
under obligation to the public.
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.L4
In Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant" a federal court of appeals
rejected the licensing argument. The Negro plaintiff, suing the restaurant on
the ground that it had violated his rights under the fourteenth amendment
in excluding him from the premises, argued that "the state licenses restaurants
to serve the public and thereby is burdened with the positive duty to prohibit
unjust discrimination in the use and enjoyment of the facilities."40 Speaking of
the licensing law of Virginia, the court said: "The statute is obviously designed
to protect the health of the community but it does not authorize state officials
to control the management of the business or to dictate what persons shall
be served." '5 0
Williams was followed by Slack v. Atlantic White Tower Sys., Inc.,51
involving basically the same facts and arguments. Here the plaintiff also relied
upon the fact that the defendant was a foreign corporation, admitted and
licensed to do business by the State of Maryland. The court dismissed this
argument as lacking support in the cases502 and rejected the licensing argument
on much the same ground as in Williams, an additional factor being the complete absence of regulatory provisions of any kind in Maryland's restaurant
53
licensing statute.
The strongest direct support for the licensing and regulation argument is
to be found in Public Util. Comm. v. Pollak.54 The action was brought by
passengers of the mass transit lines of the District of Columbia, who alleged
that certain practices of the Capital Transit Company violated their rights
under the first and fifth amendments. The preliminary question of whether or not
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.

296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697, cert. denied, 332 US. 761 (1947).
Id. at 254, 72 N.E.2d at 698.
Id. at 255, 72 N.E.2d at 699.
332 U.S. 761 (1947).
268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959).

49. Id. at 847.
50. Id. at 848.
51.
52.

181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md.), afPd per curiam, 284 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1960).
Id. at 129.

53. Ibid. The law, as set forth in the opinion, appears to be purely a revenue measure.
54.

343 U.S. 451 (1952).
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the federal government could be held responsible for the practices of the company was answered affirmatively by the court of appeals, which based its
finding on the fact that the company enjoyed a special monopolistic franchise
from Congress, and that a federal regulatory agency, having conducted a
formal inquiry into the practices, concluded that they were legally permissible
and not contrary to the public welfare. 55 The Supreme Court, in sustaining the
lower court on this question, relied on the fact "that Capital Transit operates
its service under the regulatory supervision" of the congressional agency, and,
more particularly, on the fact of the federal investigation and decision. 50 These
factors were considered sufficient to establish a "relation" between the5 7federal
government and the company activities to which objection was made.
The peculiar facts of the Pollak case (particularly the monopolistic position
of the company under congressional franchise) make it difficult to draw any
conclusions from the Court's decision. But the case is not inconsistent with lower
court decisions, which, insofar as they have considered the question of state
licensing and regulation, have taken into account the closeness of the regulatory
activities to the acts in question. In Pollak the regulation could not possibly
have been closer, since it touched not only the same general area, but the very
controversy before the Court.
From a purely logical viewpoint, the weakness of the licensing argument,
insofar as it rests upon an analogy with the leasing and franchise cases, is that
it confuses words with realities. We speak of the state as "granting" a license
just as we speak of it "granting" a lease or franchise. The analogy between
these transactions is purely verbal; their substance is quite different. Licensing
is a device that gives the state certain procedural and administrative advantages
coercing those whose activities present a threat to the health or safety of the
community. If licensing were to be abolished, the same end might be accomplished (though perhaps less efficiently) by instituting separate court actions
against violators of local regulations. In short, a system of "granting" licenses
can hardly be called a favor to the businessman. Its object is to place limitations
on him. The same cannot be said of the granting of a franchise or lease, which
involves giving one corporation or group the use of public property denied
to all or most of the rest of the populace. Since the act of incorporation, which
creates a legal person where there was none before, has not been considered by
58
the courts to "involve" the state in a corporation's discriminatory acts, it
would seem, a fortiori, that the granting of a license should not do so.
In practical terms, the weakness of the licensing argument would probably
55. Pollak v. Public Util. Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
56. 343 U.S. at 462.
57. Id. at 463. Although the Government was thus held to be responsible for the practices,
it was ultimately decided that they were not violative of the first or fifth amendments.
58. Eaton v. Board of Managers, 164 F. Supp. 191 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd, 261 F.2d 521 (4th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959) (incorporated hospital not subject to fourteenth
amendment). See Slack v. Atlantic White Tower Sys., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 124, 129 (D. Md.),
aff'd per curiam, 284 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1960) (admission of foreign corporation does not
make state responsible for its discriminatory policy).
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become apparent as soon as it was sanctioned by a statute or judicial decision.
States wishing to evade the nondiscrimination requirement would abandon
licensing and simply prosecute individuals who violated health and safety regulations. The analogy to the lease and franchise cases thus being eliminated as a
basis for finding state action, the only remaining nexus between the state and
the discrimination would be the regulatory activity itself-a weak link indeed.
It is difficult to see how the state, by prosecuting the owner of restaurant A
for serving adulterated food, thereby involves itself in state action denying
equal protection of the law to patrons of segregated restaurant B.
D. Inaction as State Action
Let us suppose, however, that the courts did find sufficient state action in
such spasmodic prosecutions alone, and that the states thereupon abandoned
this as well as licensing. Could it then be argued that such total abandonment
was a subterfuge, the purpose and effect of which was to perpetuate segregation?
For the very act of abandoning regulation might be found to constitute state
action sufficient to involve the state in the subsequent discrimination. Similarly,
it could be argued that the refusal to adopt regulation in an area of activity
in which regulation was customary would be sufficient state action.59
In one recent case, the Supreme Court was faced squarely with the question
of whether a state could abandon control for the precise purpose of avoiding
the requirements of the fourteenth amendment. The Court had previously
decided that a municipal agency could not discriminate in the admission of
pupils to a college it operated, even though it was merely carrying out the
terms of a private trust fund by which the institution was financed.60 The case
was remanded to the state court for "action not inconsistent with this opinion."
The state court proceeded to remove the state agency as administrator of the
trust and to place it under the control of private administrators, who continued
the discriminatory admissions policy. This was done under the power of the
state court to transfer control of a trust whenever the trustee becomes incapable
of fulfilling its terms. Thus, the avowed objective of the state court's action
was to make possible the continuance of the discrimination. The Pennsylvania
0
Supreme Court upheld this action in in re Girard College Trusteeship. ' Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court denied review.,'
The case most nearly supporting the contention that failure to regulate may
be state action is Terry v. Adams.63 There it was held to be a violation of the
fifteenth amendment for a private political club to exclude Negroes from a voice
in its designation of candidates, where selection by the club was for all practical
purposes equivalent to election to office. It is questionable, however, whether
the application of this holding to state action under the fourteenth amendment
59. See Manning, State Responsibility Under the Fourteenth Amendment: An Adherence
to Tradition, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 201, 206-07 (1958).
60. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (per curiam).
61. 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958).
62. 357 U.S. 570 (1958) (per curiam).
63. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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is warranted. In Terry, state regulation or lack of it, and the question of
whether such regulation was customary or not, might have been ignored entirely in reaching the result. What was determinative was the particular activity
in question, i.e., the running of political primaries. Terry illustrates "the principle that governmental action may include the action of a private person who
performs a governmental function .... ,,04 The state cannot divorce itself from
responsibility for the political mechanisms upon which it depends for its own
existence. Large-scale political activities are so closely connected with the state
as to be virtually a part of it, and hence subject to the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments.
E. Nature of the Act
Thus viewed, Terry is not so relevant to the licensing argument, or even to
the theory of state inaction as constituting "state action," as it is to what may
be called the "nature of the act" theory. This argument is as old as the Civil
Rights Cases themselves, and more far-reaching than any of the more commonly
accepted arguments. The Solicitor General of the United States, in defending the
constitutionality of the public accommodations law in the Civil Rights Cases,
contended that a hotel manager, in denying accommodations to a Negro, "did
not act in an exclusively private capacity, but in one devoted to a public use,
and so affected with a public, i.e., a State interest."0 5 Implicity rejected in
the Civil Right Cases, it has found relatively little support since. One court
of appeals recently rejected the argument as applied to a hospital in Eaton v.
Board of Managers.00 It was held that a hospital was not violating the fourteenth amendment in discriminating against some of its Negro staff members,
regardless of the importance of the institution in the community and of past
state participation in its financing and operation. Over the objection of three
07
Justices, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
III. CONCLUSION
The potential scope and validity of public accommodations legislation under
the fourteenth amendment is largely speculative. There seems to be no question
but that the federal government could provide more effective remedies in
the situations that have already been found to involve unconstitutional state
64. Barnes v. City of Gadsden, 268 F.2d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1959) (opinion concurring In
part and dissenting in part).
65. 109 U.S. at 6. For more recent examples of the same line of argument, see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 274 (1963) ;
and Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962). In the
latter case, summary judgment was given for a Negro plaintiff seeking admission to Tulane,
on the ground that the public nature of such an educational institution made it subject to

the fourteenth amendment. The same court, differently constituted, subsequently vacated the
summary judgment. On appeal of the procedural question, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962) (per

curiam), this was held to be within the district court's discretion. After a trial on the merits,

the district court held for the defendant university. 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
66. 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958).
67. 359 U.S. 984 (1959).

